The S & E Contractors Case—Beheading the Hydra or Wreaking Devastation? by Pasley, Robert S.
-Duke I& Journal
VOLUME 1973 APRL NuMER 1
THE S & E CONTRACTORS CASE-BEHEADING
THE HYDRA OR WREAKING DEVASTATION?
ROBERT S. PASLEY*
Stated briefly, the question in S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United
States' was whether the Government could appeal an agency decision
under the standard disputes clause of a government contract. Stated
bluntly, the answer of the Supreme Court was "No." "And there's
an end on't," as the old saying goes.
But neither the question nor the answer is quite that simple.
For the question, as I hope to show, may be put in quite a different
fashion. And the answer was given by a Court which divided 5 to
3,2 reversing a 4-3 decision of the Court of Claims,; which in
turn had overruled a decision of the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC)4 after the Comptroller General had ruled that the Commis-
sion's decision was not "final and conclusive."5 In all, these four
sets of opinions take up over 250 pages of the reports. Obviously,
the question seemed far from simple to those who had to decide it.
The facts of the case are complicated, but the essentials are
stated clearly and succinctly in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion:6
* Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B. 1933, Princeton University;
LL.B. 1936, Cornell University.
1. 406 U.S. 1 (1972).
2. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice Blackmun wrote
a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Powell joined. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion, inl which Justices
White and Marshall joined. Justice Rehnquist did not participate.
3. 433 F.2d 1373 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
4. 2 A.E.C. 850, modifying 2 A.E.C. 631 (1964).
5. 46 Comp. GEr. 441 (1966).
6. The somewhat longer statement of facts found in the opinion of the Court,
406 U.S. at 5-7, may be consulted for a detailed account of just what happened, but
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
This is a suit by petitioner against the United States to recover
on a contract between petitioner and the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion. The contract included a "disputes clause," which provided
that the Commission would decide any factual disputes that arose
under the contract and that its decision would "be final and con-
clusive unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to
have been fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly er-
roneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by sub-
stantial evidence." The disputes clause also provided that while it
did "not preclude consideration of law questions in connection with
[disputes] decisions," it was not to "be construed as making final the
[Commission's] decision. . . on a question of law." Disputes arose
during performance of the contract, and the Commission decided
them in petitioner's favor. The General Accounting Office, how-
ever, when rendering an advance opinion requested on behalf of the
Commission as to one of the disputed items, disagreed with the Com-
mission's decision, and for that reason the Commission refused to
pay. In petitioner's subsequent suit in the Court of Claims, peti-
tioner relied upon the Commission's decision as a "final and con-
clusive" resolution of the disputes, entitling petitioner to summary
judgment. The Department of Justice defended the suit on the
grounds that the Commission's decision was not supported by sub-
stantial evidence and was erroneous on questions of law. The issue
before us is whether the Government, through the Department of
Justice, may assert those defenses. 7
The disputes clause, which has long been used in government
contracts, provides in brief that any dispute concerning a question of
fact arising under the contract shall be decided in the first instance
by the contracting officer, with the right in the contractor to appeal
to the head of the contracting agency or his designated representa-
tive, which in practice usually means a board of contract appeals.
(In the S & E case, the AEC had not yet established a board of con-
tract appeals, and the contractor's appeal was referred to a hearing
examiner, subject to review by the Commission.) The decision of
the agency head or board of contract appeals is final and conclusive,
subject to certain exceptions. Meanwhile the contractor has to go
forward with the work. In other words, within the scope of the dis-
putes clause, the contractor forgoes any resort to the courts and
agrees to accept a kind of unilateral arbitration. In theory, this proc-
ess assures him of speed and simplicity in the settlement of most of
Justice Brennan's summary should be sufficient for an understanding of the issues
involved.
7. 406 U.S. at 23-24.
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his claims. In theory, and in fact as well, it assures the Government
of continued performance while the dispute is being settled.8
Although originally designed to handle factual disputes, the
disputes procedure has, by a kind of bootstrap operation through the
process of contract definition, been extended to cover all sorts of
questions which one would not ordinarily think of as "questions of
fact."'  For example, the dispute in the S & E case concerned the
amount of equitable adjustment due the contractor under various
change orders issued by the Government. "Questions of law," in
the strict sense, were another matter, and it was generally conceded
that finality did not attach to board decisions on these.10 Of this,
more anon. From the first employment of the disputes procedure,
however, it was recognized that fraud was an exception to the rule of
finality and that the contractor could challenge a board decision
based on fraud," or "such gross mistake as would necessarily imply
bad faith, or a failure to exercise an honest judgment."' 2  Over the
years, the Court of Claims extended this exception to include board
decisions which it could characterize as "capricious" or "arbitrary"' 3
or, occasionally, as having "no substantial evidence to support
[them].' 4 This process of extension came to an abrupt halt in 1951
when the Supreme Court in United States v. Wunderlich5 held that
"fraud" meant just that-namely, "conscious wrongdoing, an intention
to cheat or be dishonest."' 6
This decision, reached by a divided court,' 7 provoked conster-
8. For a full account, see Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 39 (1964).
9. This device has received the tacit approval of the Supreme Court. See United
States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
10. But see United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
11. United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
12. Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398, 402 (1878). See also Ripley v.
United States, 223 U.S. 695 (1912); Sweeney v. United States, 109 U.S. 618
(1883).
13. See, e.g., Penner Installation Corp. v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 545 (Ct.
Cl. 1950).
14. Id. at 547 (dictum); cf. Mitchell Canneries, Inc. v. United States, 77
F. Supp. 498, 503 (Ct. Cl. 1948) (substantial evidence test satisfied).
15. 342U.S. 98 (1951).
16. Id. at 100. The Court did not, however, expressly overrule its prior deci-
sions equating bad faith or dishonesty with fraud.
17. The vote was 6-3. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote an eloquent dissent with
which Mr. Justice Reed concurred. Id. at 101. Mr. Justice Jackson wrote a sep-
arate dissent, in which he stated his belief that the majority had ruled out the ex-
ception based on "such gross mistake as necessarily implied bad faith." Id. at 102.
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nation in industry and even made the procuring agencies unhappy."8
In response, a number of bills were introduced in Congress, and
after extensive hearings, the so-called Wunderlich Act 9 became law.
It is still in effect and reads as follows:
§321. Limitation on pleading contract-provisions
relating to finality; standards of review
No provision of any contract entered into by the United States,
relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head
of any department or agency or his duly authorized representative or
board in a dispute involving a question arising under such contract,
shall be pleaded in any suit now filed or to be filed as limiting judi-
cial review of any such decision to cases where fraud by such official
or his said representative or board is alleged: Provided, however,
That any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same
is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as nec-
essarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evi-
dence.
§322. Contract-provisions making decisions final
on questions of law
No Government contract shall contain a provision making final
on a question of law the decision of any administrative official, rep-
resentative, or board. 20
The disputes clause used in the S & E contract (which differed
only slightly from the standard disputes clause 21) reflected the Wun-
derlich Act and read as follows:
6. Disputes
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dis-
pute concerning a question of fact arising under this contract which
is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by the Contracting
Officer, who shall reduce his decision to writing and mail or other-
wise furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor. The decision of the
18. The agencies responded negatively, partly because of a desire to maintain
good relations with their contractors, and partly from concern that the latter might
inflate their prices to include a contingency factor which would balance the vir-
tual loss of judicial review occasioned by the decision.
19. 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1970). The statute might more appropriately be
called the "Anti-Wunderlich Act," as was observed by Judge Collins, dissenting in
the Court of Claims, 433 F.2d 1373, 1393 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
20. 41 U.S.C. §§ 321, 322 (1970).
21. See Armed Services Procurement Regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12 (1972);
Federal Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.101-12 (1972). These are the
clauses prescribed for fixed-price supply contracts. Similar clauses are prescribed
for other types of contracts.
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Contracting Officer shall be final and conclusive unless, within 30
days from the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor mails or
otherwise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a written appeal ad-
dressed to the Commission. The decision of the Commission or its
duly authorized representative for the determination of such appeals
shall be final and conclusive unless determined by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary,
or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. In connection with any appeal pro-
ceeding under this clause, the Contractor shall be afforded an oppor-
tunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of its appeal.
Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall
proceed diligently with the performance of the contract and in ac-
cordance with the Contracting Officer's decision.
(b) This 'Disputes' Clause does not preclude consideration of
law questions in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph
(a) above; Provided, that nothing in this contract shall be construed
as making final the decision of any administrative official, repre-
sentative, or board on a question of law.22
THE OPINIONS OF THE JUSTICES
The decision of the Supreme Court in the S & E case was that
the judgment of the Court of Claims, which had upheld the right of
the Government to raise the defenses which it had set forth and had
remanded the case to its commissioner for his consideration and re-
port on the merits,23 should be reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote
the opinion of the court; there was a concurring opinion by Mr.
Justice Blackmun and a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan.
The Douglas Majority Opinion
In his usual forceful and succinct style, Mr. Justice Douglas
made the following points:
1. The disputes clause is intended to provide a quick and ef-
fective administrative remedy.24 This requires that, absent fraud
or bad faith, finality be attached to the decision of the con-
tracting agency without the subsequent interposition of further re-
22. 406 U.S. at 3 n.2.
23. The Court of Claims had disagreed, 4-3, with the initial report of its
Commissioner, The Honorable Mastin G. White, formerly Solicitor for the Depart-
ment of the Interior, who had recommended granting the plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment.
24. 406 U.S. at 8.
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view by other government officials. Any other result might be
"sheer disaster. '25  In the particular case, almost 10 years had
passed between completion of the contract and the final decision of
the Supreme Court.
2. The Government should be regarded "as a unit rather than
as an amalgam of separate entities. ' 26  Here the AEC spoke for
the Government. The Comptroller General had no further power
of review and the Wunderlich Act failed to give him such power; in
fact "Congress . . plainly denied ' '27 it to him. The function of the
Attorney General's office is to conduct and supervise government liti-
gation and in that connection normally to implement rather than to
repudiate the decision of a coordinate branch. The Wunderlich
Act gives it no "right to appeal"2 a decision of the contracting
agency. In fact, the Wunderlich Act did not in itself confer any
rights of appeal. It was simply designed to overrule the Wunderlich
case. "It should not be construed to require a citizen to perform the
Herculean task of beheading the Hydra in order to obtain justice
from his Government. '29
3. A contractor's fraud is a different matter."0 Fraud is always
ground for setting aside a judgment. Apart from the "inherent
power of courts to deal with fraud, '8 1 various statutes32 indicate that
"the Department of Justice indubitably has standing to appear or in-
tervene at any time in any appropriate court to restrain enforcement
of contracts with the United States based on fraud. ' 33  But here no
fraud or bad faith was involved or even claimed.
4. Finally, if "the General Accounting Office or the Depart-
ment of Justice is to be an ombudsman reviewing each and every de-
cision rendered by the coordinate branches of the Government, that
mandate should come from Congress, not from this Court." 4
25. Id.
26. Id. at 10.
27. Id. at 12.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 14. Mr. Justice Douglas apparently forgot that beheading the
Hydra was not enough, for according to the legend this only caused two heads to
grow where there had been but one before. But his meaning is plain enough.
30. 406 U.S. at 15.
31. Id. at 17.
32. For example, Mr. Justice Douglas cited 41 U.S.C. §§ 116(b), 118(d),
118(e), 119 (1970); 40 U.S.C. § 489(b) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 2514 (1970). 406
U.S. at 16.
33. 406 U.S. at 17.
34. Id. at 19.
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Justice Blackmun's Concurring Opinion
Mr. Justice Blackmun wrote an eight-point concurring opinion,
in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Powell con-
curred2. 5 Besides reemphasizing the points made by Mr. Justice
Douglas, he added the following observations:
1. It makes no sense for the Government, through one agency,
to challenge its own executive determination made by another
agency.36
2. The disputes clause has been employed for over 40 years, 7
was drawn by the Government itself, and, with specified exceptions,
has never been regarded as conferring the "right of judicial review
on the part of the Government."3"
3. The Government's position is anomalous in that, while it
recognizes the finality of an unappealed decision of the contracting
officer, it would deny that finality to a decision reached, after appeal,
by the agency head.3 9
4. For the Government to disavow the decision of the agency
head is to impose an additional contract term never accepted by the
contractor, very possibly a breach of contract.4 °
5. The legislative history of the Wunderlich Act is unclear, at
best "decidedly ambigious. '41 But there is nothing in it to indicate
a "nod in the direction of the Government,"42 and the "flat rejection
by Congress of the proposed provision for GAO review is signifi-
cant."43
The Brennan Dissenting Opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall,44
wrote a long and forceful dissent, accompanied by an appendix de-
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 20. While this may be true of disputes clauses of the sort now in
use, the disputes procedure goes back at least to Kihlberg v. United States, 97
U.S. 398 (1878), and possibly to United States v. Adams, 74 U.S. 463 (1868).
38. 406 U.S. at 20.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 21. Some of the briefs filed on behalf of the petitioner make much
of this point, but it really begs the question.
41. 406 U.S. at 22.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 23.
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tailing the legislative history of the Wunderlich Act.45 The main
points of the opinion were these:
1. Prior to the Wunderlich Act, the contractor could challenge
the finality of a disputes decision solely on the ground of fraud, dis-
honesty, or bad faith. 46  The Government had the same right. The
former would raise the issue by a suit in the Court of Claims under
the Tucker Act47 for breach of contract. The latter would raise it
by refusing to pay, usually at the instance of the Comptroller Gen-
eral, thus forcing the contractor to bring a suit which would be de-
fended by the Attorney General.
The only change in this procedure brought about by the Wun-
derlich Act was to broaden the grounds of challenge from fraud,
dishonesty, and bad faith to include the additional reasons listed in
the Act, such as lack of substantial evidence. 48 If a court deter-
mines that the decision is not final and conclusive under any of the
grounds specified in the Act and now spelled out in the disputes
clause, then the decision is not final and conclusive. It makes no
difference, under the Act or the clause, which party raises the issue
in court or by what procedural route.
2. "Today's decision is demonstrably wrong. '40  It is "with-
out an iota of support in the language of the Act, which expressly
governs 'any' disputes decision in 'any suit,' or in the Act's legislative
history, which confirms that the expanded grounds of judicial re-
view were to be available to both the Government and contractors.
,50
3. From Kihlberg v. United States,1 decided in 1878, until
today, the Supreme Court has never deviated from the position that
the same standard of judicial review of a disputes decision is availa-
ble to both sides.52 In support of this proposition, Mr. Justice Bren-
nan reviewed the leading cases since Kihlberg, including a number
involving contracts between private parties which contained a com-
parable disputes clause. He observed:
45. Id. at 69.
46. Id. at 24.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970). The district courts have parallel jurisdiction
over claims not exceeding $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970).
48. 406 U.S. at 26. See text following note 20 supra.
49. 406 U.S. at 29.
50. Id.
51. 97 U.S. 398 (1878).
52. 406 U.S. at 31-37.
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We thus have an unbroken line of cases in this Court, from
1878 to 1951, applying a simple, straight-forward rule of judicial re-
view. A contractual disputes clause making final a decision by an
agent of one of the parties was given full effect in court, subject to
the judicially created exception that allowed relief to the party chal-
lenging the decision if he was able to prove that it was fraudulent.
This rule applied whether the contract was Government or private
and no matter which party challenged the finality of the decision.
In short, a disputes clause was equally binding upon both parties.53
The Court of Claims, which has decided most of the court cases
arising under the disputes clause, has consistently taken the same
position.5 4
4. The Comptroller General's opinion of a disputes decision is
irrelevant in court. This is true even where he favors the contractor.
Where he favors the Government, his "only power-the power of
the purse-[is] to force the contractor to bring suit and thus obtain
judicial review for the Government." 55  Once the case reaches the
court, review is the same for both parties.
5. When the Wunderlich case effectively limited judicial review
to cases of fraud, the first important corrective bill" would sim-
ply have overruled that case, without specifying what the expanded
scope of judicial review was to be. A substitute bill,57 offered by
GAO, (1) explicitly defined the expanded scope of review, and (2)
authorized GAO review in addition to court review. The latter
went beyond any prior power the GAO had (which was merely to
block payment) and would have given GAO authority to upset a
disputes decision, increasing its power "enormously."5" "Not sur-
prisingly, this part of GAO's proposal became highly controver-
sial."5 9  As reported out of committee, amended S. 2487 incorpo-
rated the GAO proposal ° but, although this bill passed the Senate,
the House had not acted on it when the Eighty-second Congress ex-
pired.
In the Eighty-third Congress, the GAO provision provoked con-
53. Id. at 37.
54. Id. at 37-44.
55. Id. at 39.
56. S. 2487, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
57. See Hearings on S. 2487 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952).
58. 406 U.S. at 49.
59. Id.
60. S. REP. No. 1670, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1952).
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troversy, not because it afforded judicial review at the behest of ei-
ther party, but because it would set up the GAO as a separate re-
viewing authority, a kind of court in its own right. Bowing to this
opposition, the Comptroller General agreed to deletion of the ob-
jectionable provision, 6' claiming (erroneously) that he had not asked
for any authority which he did not already possess. 62
In urging passage of the substitute bill, GAO's General Coun-
sel stated (correctly, from his point of view) that it would protect
not only contractors but also the Government by providing an ex-
panded, but coextensive, judicial review.063 During the course of
the hearings, no one questioned this position; in fact, a version of
the bill which would have expressly limited the right of judicial re-
view to contractors was rejected. 4
The bill, as finally reported and adopted, "expanded the scope
of judicial review, and that was all it did."'65 This is clear from the
text of the Act, the committee reports, the testimony in commit-
tee, and the explanation of the bill's sponsors on the floor of the
House.
Moreover, the "bill that became the Wunderlich Act was a
Government bill. . . . It is absurd to suppose that the Govern-
ment pressed for a bill that granted contractors an expanded scope
of judicial review, inserted in the bill by the Government, yet denied
the Government judicial review on those same grounds."' 6 This in-
terpretation is "preposterous."6
6. The majority opinion seems motivated by a determination
to attribute to Congress an intention to "abolish the authority of
GAO to disapprove payments to contractors under disputes deci-
sions, thus forcing contractors to sue. .. ."68 Its "bate noire then,
is primarily the General Accounting Office, with a sideswipe at the
Department of Justice."69 And it assumes that Congress shared its
"distaste for the activities of those agencies in these cases. ... 1
61. Hearings on H.R. 1839 and S. 124, H.R. 3634, and H.R. 6946 Before Sub-
comm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 136
(1953-54).
62. Id. at 135.
63. Id. at 39.
64. Id. at 89.
65. 406 U.S. at 56.
66. Id. at 59.
67. Id. at 60.
68. Id. at 62.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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To this there are three answers:
a. "The notion that Congress enacted the Wunderlich Act to
abolish the authority of GAO and the Department of Justice is com-
pletely a figment of the Court's own imagination. As the judicial
history shows, both agencies have exercised for decades powers iden-
tical to those exercised in this case. . .. ,,7 This is supported by
the Committee report that accompanied the Wunderlich bill.72
b. It is irrelevant that "'the AEC withheld payment solely be-
cause of the views of the Comptroller General.' ,3 The only ques-
tion is the scope of court review.
c. It is inapposite to say that the Department of Justice is
claiming a "'right to appeal'" or a "'power to appeal.' 7 That
Department is involved only because, as a result of GAO's refusal
to sanction payment, a lawsuit has been created which it is the duty
of the Department of Justice to defend.
7. By overturning established precedent, the Court's decision
wreaks "devastation '75 upon Government procurement practices.
Not only do American taxpayers stand to lose over a million dollars
in this case, but "countless millions"76 are at stake in other cases.
Immediate congressional action is required to "restore the former
balance between Government and contractor" 77 and to "make more
explicit what is already explicit in the Wunderlich Act, but this time
in terms so plain that even this Court will be unable to thwart the
congressional will."'
8. Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion also discussed at some length
the fraud exception, taking issue with the majority's approach to the
fraud problem, and, more briefly, the "question of law" exception,
which was not discussed in the majority or concurring opinions.
These two matters will be discussed separately later on.
A Postscript
As can be seen from the foregoing summary of the contentions
advanced in the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions, the
71. Id. at 63.
72. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1954).
73. 406 U.S. at 65, quoting id. at 10 (opinion of the Court).
74. Id. at 65, quoting id. at 12-13 (opinion of the Court).
75. Id. at 31.
76. Id. at 60.
77. Id. at 31.
78. Id.
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arguments pro and con regarding government appeal of agency con-
tract dispute decisions are numerous and diverse. Still more argu-
ments are adduced in the majority and dissenting opinions of the
Court of Claims,"0 in the opinion of the Comptroller General,80
and in a prior opinion of the Attorney General in a different case in-
volving the same general problem."' There would be little point
in listing all of these now, although some of them will be mentioned
later.
Nor is there really any point in debating whether the Supreme
Court correctly decided the case. Roma locua est. A law review,
or even a law professor, is not a higher court of appeal. 82 If the
law is to be changed now, the change must come from Congress.88
Rather, I propose to concentrate on two aspects of the problem:
1. Retrospectively, how can one account for the extraordinary
diversity of opinion among the judges, the public officials, and the
commentators on what seems to be a very simple question?
2. Prospectively, what, if any, remedial legislation is desira-
ble?
JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE WUNDERLICH ACT
Philosophers know that, far more important than the answer to
any problem, is the question which is asked. For the latter will dic-
tate, if not the answer itself, the terms of reference (the "parameters"
to use the current jargon) within which the debate will be conducted.
79. 433 F.2d 1373, 1381, 1392 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
80. 46 CoM. GEN. 441 (1966).
81. 42 Op. ATry GEN. No. 33, 13 CCH CoNT. CAS. FED. 9 82,490 (Jan. 16,
1969).
82. As of this writing, there appear to have been relatively few law review
articles or notes on the decision of the Supreme Court in the S & E case. See, eg.,
48 NoTRE DAcm LAW. 483 (1972). There were, however, a number of com-
mentaries on the case in its prior stages or on the general problem. See, e.g.,
Cibinic & Lasken, The Comptroller General and Government Contracts, 38 GEo.
WASH. L. Rnv. 349, at 366-72 (1970); Kipps, The Right of the Government to Have
Judicial Review of a Board of Contract Appeals Decision Made Under the Disputes
Clause, 2 PuB. CoNT. LU. 286 (1969); Comment, The Government's "Right of
Appeal" from Adverse Decisions of the Board of Contract Appeals, 22 BAYLOR L.
Ruv. 191 (1970); Comment, S & E Contractors and the GAO Role in Government
Contracts Disputes: A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Finality, 55 VA.
L. REv. 762 (1969); Note, GAO Review of Contract Appeal Board Decisions, 54
MINN. L REV. 694 (1970); 18 CATH. U.L. REv. 544 (1969).
83. Or, the change could be made administratively, by a recasting of the dis-
putes clause. This possibility will be discussed infra pp. 37-38, along with legislative
proposals.
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And so here. If we ask the question, "May the Comptroller Gen-
eral or the Attorney General review and reverse an agency decision
under the disputes clause or, stated otherwise, may the Government
seek to repudiate its own decision?", then the negative answer of the
majority in the S & E case is highly persuasive. If on the other hand,
we ask the question, "May a court having jurisdiction, by whatever
procedural route such jurisdiction has been obtained, review and nul-
lify a disputes decision, whether for or against the contractor, for
failure to meet the standards for finality of the Wunderlich Act?",
then the logic of the dissent becomes almost compelling.
I suggest that a good deal of the problem presented by this
case arises from a failure to understand the precise meaning of the
phrase "judicial review," as used in this procedural context and in
the Wunderlich Act itself, and a failure to note the very great trans-
formation which that concept has undergone since enactment of the
Act.
What is "Judicial Review" Under the Wunderlich Act?
Judicial review is a phrase of many meanings. It is often used
to refer to the power of a court to pass upon the constitutionality of
a statute.8 4 Obviously, this definition is not relevant here.
The term is also used in a loose sense when what is really
meant is appellate review, the power of an appellate court to review
the proceedings of the court below (usually only on the record) and
affirm, modify or reverse the judgment, remand for further proceed-
ings, or take other appropriate action. Some of the language used
in the S & E case and elsewhere in discussions of the Wunderlich
Act might lead the unguarded to believe that this is what is involved
here. For example, Mr. Justice Douglas says: "Some have urged
that where a decision of a board of contract appeals is involved,
the United States should have standing to appeal to the Court of
Claims. ' 85 And Mr. Justice Brennan says, of the post-Wunderlich
disputes clause: "It does not direct that the Commission's decision is
final and conclusive unless the contractor appeals to the courts."8' 6
At the hearings on the Wunderlich bill a witness for industry
84. Dean Strong prefers the term "constitutional review" for this concept.
Strong, Three Little Words and What They Didn't Seem to Mean, 59 A.B.A.J. 29
(1973); Strong, Judicial Review: A Tri-Dimensional Concept of Administrative-
Constitutional Law, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 111, 249 (1967).
85. 406 U.S. at 18.
86. Id. at 26-27 n.1.
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testified that as a result of the Wunderlich case "neither the Govern-
ment through the GAO, nor the contractors through the courts have
any right to appeal from contracting officers' decisions even though
they may be grossly erroneous."' 7 But elsewhere in the S & E case
the Court noted that the "power to appeal to the Court of Claims a
decision of the federal agency under a disputes clause . . . is not to
be found in the Wunderlich Act and its underlying legislative his-
tory."8 8  Mr. Justice Brennan commented that "[n]o one suggests
that the Department of Justice has a 'right to appeal.' "89
The latter statements are correct for a very simple reason. The
Court of Claims is not an appellate court, but a court of original
jurisdiction. 0 So far as pertinent here, its jurisdiction is to hear
and decide any claim against the Government founded "upon any
express or implied contract with the United States." 1  The same is
true of the district courts with respect to their more limited jurisdic-
tion under the Tucker Act.92
What happens, at least in theory, when a contractor believes
that a disputes decision fails to meet the standards of the Wunder-
lich Act, is that he files a suit in the Court of Claims, or in a district
court, under the Tucker Act for breach of contract. This is a suit
de novo and in no sense an appeal. The Government's answer is to
plead the disputes decision as final and conclusive, thus barring the
claim. Only if the court finds that the disputes decision does not
meet the standards of the Wunderlich Act is it authorized to con-
sider it on the merits. This is, of course, a kind of judicial review,
albeit a limited one, but it is not appellate review. Moreover, it ex-
plains the rather strange and backhanded language of the Wunder-
lich Act:
No provision of any contract. . . relating to the finality or con-
87. Id. at 78 (emphasis added) (statement of George P. Leonard, an officer
of the Wunderlich Contracting Company).
88. Id. at 13.
89. Id. at 65.
90. It is true that in most cases the actual trial is held before a Commissioner,
and the Court of Claims acts in a quasi-appellate capacity, reviewing the Commis-
sioner's report and recommendations after receiving briefs from the parties and
hearing arguments. See Bennett, The United States Court of Claims, a 50 Year
Perspective, 29 FED. B.J. 284, 290-98 (1970). But for the present purposes the
Court of Claims and its Commissioners may be regarded as a single entity.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(4) (1970).
92. Id. § 1346(a) (2) (1970) (claims not exceeding $10,000). Hereafter, when
reference is made to the Court of Claims, it should be understood as including the
district courts as well, unless the context indicates otherwise.
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clusiveness of any decision of the head of any department or agency
or his duly authorized representative or board . . shall be pleaded
in any suit. . . as limiting judicial review of any such decision to
cases where fraud by such official or his said representative or board
is alleged. .... 93
This precise procedure was not available to the Government,
not because it had no "right of appeal" from a disputes decision, but
because the Tucker Act made no provision for suits by the Govern-
ment against a contractor for breach of contract-the only purpose
of the Tucker Act was to remove the bar of sovereign immunity in
suits against the Government. (Outside the disputes clause area of
factual controversy, the Government may sue its contractors in the
ordinary way in the district courts or even in the state courts.) But
the Government could, and occasionally did, obtain judicial review
of a disputes decision by refusing payment, forcing the contractor
to sue for breach of contract, and then raising the defense of non-
finality. Or the Government could counterclaim in a suit brought
by the contractor on another claim. Or it might even bring an in-
dependent action in a federal district court against the contractor for
recovery of money allegedly owed by the contractor which the con-
tractor claimed was not owing because of a disputes decision. Of
course, all these avenues of defense or recovery by the Government
are now barred as a result of the S & E case.94 And yet, as the dissent
argues, there does not seem to be anything in the Wunderlich Act it-
self to compel this result.
What Has Judicial Review Become Under the Wunderlich Act?
Technically, the foregoing analysis is still legally correct. But
"a funny thing happened on the way to the forum."95  The fly in
the ointment was the inclusion of the phrase "not supported by sub-
stantial evidence" at the end of the proviso to the first section of
the Wunderlich Act,9 6 an insertion which had the effect of convert-
ing the Court of Claims into an appellate court, for all practical pur-
93. 41 U.SC. § 321 (1970) (emphasis added). The Wunderlich Act is not
well drafted, but in this respect it is at least technically accurate.
94. This was pointed out by Mr. Justice Brennan. 406 U.S. at 28 n.3. Fur-
thermore, the Court of Claims has already ruled out the possibility of circumventing
the S & E rule by use of a counterclaim. Dynalectron Corp. v. United States, 18
CCH Cor. CAs. FED. 81,757 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
95. With apologies to the author of Comment, 55 VA. L. REv., supra note 82.
96. 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
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poses, whenever it was called on to consider the effect of a disputes
decision.
It is true that, prior to the Wunderlich Act, the Court of Claims
had occasionally refused to attach finality to a disputes decision un-
der a substantial evidence test.97 But such decisions were not nu-
merous and were overshadowed by the more frequent invocation of
the grounds of capriciousness or arbitrariness. During the period
between the Wunderlich case and the Wunderlich Act, the Depart-
ment of Defense had been using its own contract clause to negative
the effect of the Wunderlich case, and that clause made no mention
of "substantial evidence." 8  Just how the phrase got into the bill is
uncertain, but it is clear that it was inspired by section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 9 and by such cases as Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. NLRB. 100 The APA reference is to judicial
review of agency action based on an administrative hearing under
sections 7 and 8 of the Act "or otherwise reviewed on the record of
an agency hearing provided by statute."''1 1 The Consolidated Edi-
son case, decided before enactment of the APA, involved a petition
to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit under the National
Labor Relations Act 92 to review and set aside an order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, the Board in turn asking the court to
enforce the order. Whatever the statutory procedure involved, this
was in substance an appeal to an appellate court from an administra-
tive order made after a hearing.
The inclusion in the Wunderlich Act of what amounted to a
new criterion for review (although there was some precedent for it)
provoked very little debate.' 03 But it did cause some. At the time,
I was Assistant General Counsel of the Navy and testified briefly in
support of the bill, taking the position that it did little more than re-
affirm what the agencies were already doing by means of a contract
clause. But I added:
97. See cases cited in note 14 supra.
98. See Shedd, supra note 8, at 80.
99. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970).
100. 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
101. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1970).
102. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970).
103. It was referred to as an "additional standard" in the Report of the House
Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. R11. No. 1380, supra note 72, at 4. See also
Schultz, Wunderlich Revisited: New Limits on Judicial Review of Administrative
Determination of Government Contract Disputes, 29 LAw & CONTEMI. PnOn. 115,
117 (1964).
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Sir, our revised article, we feel, does take care of most of the
features of the Wunderlich case that contractors found objectionable.
We provide in there that a decision will not be final if it is found by
a court of competent jurisdiction that it is arbitrary or capricious.
We do not say anything about "substantial evidence." How much
difference that makes, in fact, I do not know .... 104
With the benefit of almost 20 years of hindsight, I would now char-
acterize that as the understatement of several decades.
Other observers were more emphatic. One witness doubted
the advisability of the substantial evidence test "where you have nei-
ther a full-fledged administrative record for a court to examine, nor
a court. . . designed to provide appellate review." 105
But neither the Department of Defense nor the General Services
Administration opposed inclusion of the new criterion, while con-
ceding that it appeared "to provide an appellate type of review of
the administrative decision." 0 6 The strongest argument in its favor
was that it would force those agencies which "did not have a hearing
procedure comparable with Armed Services Board of Contract Ap-
peals [ASBCA] to produce their witnesses at a hearing and dis-
close to the contractor the evidence relied on to support the deci-
sion."107  What was only dimly perceived, if perceived at all, was
that the type of judicial review contemplated by the APA was a re-
view on the record and only on the record.
The Court of Claims, consistently with its status as a court of
original jurisdiction, had always given a contractor a de novo trial in
a suit under the Tucker Act: it would hear and consider all relevant
evidence, from either side, bearing on the claim, including the ques-
tion whether the agency disputes decision, if there had been one,
met its standards for finality and, if not, whether the Government
had in fact breached the contract. It continued to take this position
after passage of the Wunderlich Act. The Department of Justice,
on the other hand, was equally determined to limit judicial review to
review on the record without consideration of any new or extraneous
evidence.
The stage for decision of the issue was set dramatically by the
104. Hearings on H.R. 1839 and S. 124, H.R. 3634, and H.R. 6946 Before
Subcomm. No. I of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
(1953-54).
105. Id. at 119.
106. Id. at 57.
107. Shedd, supra note 8, at 83.
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case of Volentine and Littleton v. United States.108 Plaintiffs
brought suit under the Tucker Act, claiming additional amounts be-
yond those awarded by the contracting officer and alleging that the
disputes decision which had been made was arbitrary, capricious,
fraudulent, and not based on substantial evidence. They introduced
evidence intended to show that there had been a breach of contract
by the Government and that there was no substantial support for
the departmental disputes decision. The Government, through the
Department of Justice, declined to introduce any evidence, taking
the position that plaintiffs had failed to produce the only piece of
evidence that was material-namely, the record made before the
contracting officer and the head of the department. The Court of
Claims refused to adopt the Government's position: "What the
Government asks us to do would run counter to the traditional
handling of the problem."'0 9  Significantly, the concurring opinion
said:
The word "review" when used in statutes does not necessarily
imply review in the appellate sense ...
While the expression "supported by substantial evidence"
is normally found only in statutes conferring appellate jurisdiction
...without more [it] does not amount to a definition of the scope
of judicial review. . . . [T]he reference in House Report 1380 to
section 10 of the Administrative Procedures [sic] Act ...does not
warrant our reading into the Wunderlich Act provisions contained in
the Administrative Procedures [sic] Act but not appearing in the
Wunderlich Act. °
Even the dissenting judge did not disagree with this formulation.
He merely thought that in most cases a review on the record would
be (1) necessary and (2) sufficient to dispose of the finality issue."'
Subsequently, the question was presented to the courts of ap-
peals in various circuits, with divergent results. 1 2  The Supreme
Court brought the debate to an end in the important case of United
States v. Carlo Bianchi Co.1 3 In a 7-2 decision the Court held that,
apart from questions of fraud, determination of the finality to be
108. 145 F. Sapp. 952 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
109. Id. at 642.
110. Id. at 645.
111. Id. at 650.
112. Compare Allied Paint & Color Works v. United States, 309 F.2d 133 (2d
Cir. 1962) and Wells & Wells, Inc. v. United States, 269 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1959)
with Lowell 0. West Lumber Sales v. United States, 270 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1959).
113. 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
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attached to a departmental disputes decision under the Wunderlich
Act must rest solely on consideration of the record before the de-
partment, and no new evidence might be received or considered.
With the correctness of this ruling we are not now concerned.
The important point is that it was the decisive step in transforming
for all practical purposes any Tucker Act proceeding which involves
a disputes decision into an appeal (although an appeal within the
relatively narrow bounds of the Wunderlich Act). But the legal
theory of a suit de novo in a court of original jurisdiction was not
repudiated. Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, agreed
that ordinarily the function of the court in such a suit was to re-
ceive evidence and make findings on disputed facts. But to follow
this procedure where a disputes decision was involved would cause
delay and duplication and, more importantly, would frustrate the
congressional purpose to force the agencies to provide a full and
fair administrative hearing and to compel both sides to present all
their evidence at such hearing without the privilege of withholding
some of it for a subsequent judicial proceeding. The dissenting
opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas focused on the "subnormal adminis-
trative procedures"' 14 of some boards of contract appeals and their
occasional practice (as had been alleged in the Bianchi case itself)
of relying on ex parte hearsay outside the record. Mr. Justice Doug-
las did not discuss the theoretical question whether an "appeal" or
a suit de novo was involved. But it is hard to disagree with one
commentator, who said:
Bianchi was a case with a theory. The contract boards were
to be shoehorned into the model of independent administrative agen-
cies-even though they were not subject to the APA and had pro-
cedural shortcomings. The Court of Claims was to be flattened
from a split level government contracts court which took de novo evi-
dence to a somewhat artificial court of appeals largely reviewing on
the record.11
The Bianchi case provoked considerable discussion at the time,
and there were proposals for congressional overruling. 16 But noth-
114. Id. at 721.
115. Note, Government Contracts Disputes: An Institutional Approach, 73 YALE
L.L 1408, 1441 (1964).
116. See, e.g., Madden, Bianchi's Ghost, 16 A. L. REV. 22 (1963); Spector, Is It
"Bianchi's Ghost"-Or "Much Ado About Nothing"?, 22 LAw & CoNrEmp. PROB.
87 (1964). Judge Madden had written the initial opinion of the Court of Claims in
Carlo Bianchi & Co. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 514 (CL Cl. 1959), which was
eventually reversed by the Supreme Court, 373 U.S. 709 (1963), but he had retired
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ing came of these and, while the debate lingers onW1 the rule of
the case has come to be accepted by government procurement spe-
cialists.
The trend set in motion by the Bianchi case was confirmed by
a trilogy of cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1966 and 1967.
Again, we are not concerned with the merits of the decisions in
these cases, but only with their relation to the question of the real
nature of "judicial review" of a disputes decision.
In United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc.,1"8 the Court
held unanimously that, where a board of contract appeals had im-
properly dismissed an appeal from a disputes decision by a contract-
ing officer for lack of timely filing, the Court of Claims could not
hear the claim de novo but had to send it back to the board for a
hearing on the merits and a final disputes decision. In other words,
when the disputes procedure is applicable, it must be followed, and
there can be no circumventing it by granting a trial de novo, even
in the interest of saving time.
United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co. 09 was more
complicated. Here three claims were involved, two involving a dis-
putes decision, at least in part, and the third, a "pure" breach of
contract claim as to which the board of contract appeals had dis-
claimed jurisdiction. 120 Underlying the first two claims were certain
questions of fact on which the board had made findings, although
it was able to grant only partial relief. The Supreme Court held
unanimously: first, that only the claims, or aspects thereof, which
were covered by the disputes clause of the contract (or by other
contract clauses specifically incorporating the disputes clause) could
be decided with finality by a board of contract appeals; secondly,
that claims not so covered, as well as those aspects of other claims
from the Court when he gave the address on which this article was based. Louis
Spector was the Chairman of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals.
117. It is interesting that, although in 1964, Mr. Spector defended the Bianchi
decision against Judge Madden's criticisms and concluded that no legislation was
necessary, Spector, supra note 116, in 1971, when he had become a Commissioner
of the Court of Claims, he thought that restoration of the procedure which had
existed in the Court of Claims prior to Bianchi might be a good idea, Spector,
Public Contract Claims Procedures-A Perspective, 30 FEn. BJ. 1, 11 (1971).
Legislation to this effect was introduced by Chairman Celler of the House Ju-
diciary Committee in 1964, H.R. 10765, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) and again in
1972, H.R. 14726, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
118. 384 U.S. 424 (1966).
119. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
120. It had also held that the claim was untimely. Id. at 403.
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as to which the board could not grant relief (in this case delay dam-
ages as opposed to extensions of time), were open to a suit in the
Court of Claims; and thirdly, in such a suit the Court of Claims
could not reconsider any findings of fact properly made by the
board in support of the decisions which it did have power to make.
In other words, a finding of fact, made by the board as a necessary
incident to its decision on a disputes claim, was binding on the
Court of Claims in its consideration of a related claim not gov-
erned by the disputes clause. Stated otherwise, such a fact could
not be found one way by the board and another way by the Court,
even though the two were deciding separate claims, one subject to
the disputes procedure, and the other not. The Court called this an
illustration of the general principle of collateral estoppel.'
The third case to be mentioned is Crown Coat Front Co. v.
United States.'22  The Supreme Court, resolving a conflict among
the circuits and the Courts of Claims,' 23 held, again unanimously,
that in a Tucker Act case the six-year statute of limitations 24 did
not begin to run until conclusion of the proceedings, if any, taken
under the disputes clause. In view of the rule that the contractor
must always "exhaust his remedies" under the disputes clause, 25 the
fact that he frequently cannot be sure whether a given claim is recog-
nizable under the disputes clause or is a "pure' breach of contract
claim, the fact that both types of claims will arise under the
same contract at about the same time, and the collateral estoppel
rule laid down in Utah Construction, this seems to be the only fair
result. But it is hardly consistent with the theory that a Tucker Act
proceeding is a suit de novo for breach of contract on which the stat-
ute, under all orthodox principles, begins to run from the date of
breach, and with the fact that there is no statutory provision for its
tolling by the pendency of a disputes proceeding. From the stand-
point of pure logic, it is hard to refute the reasoning of the Second
Circuit in this respect. 2 1 But the theory of the Supreme Court was
that, by the disputes clause, the contractor had "agreed in effect to
121. 384 U.S. at 421.
122. 386 U.S. 503 (1967).
123. Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 363 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1966)
(5-4 decision); Nager Elec. Co. v. United States, 368 F.2d 847 (Ct. Cl. 1966);
Northern Metal Co. v. United States, 350 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1965).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1970).
125. United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234 (1946).
126. Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 363 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1966),
rev'd and rem'd, 386 U.S. 503 (1967).
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convert what otherwise might be claims for breach of contract into
claims for equitable adjustment"' 27 subject to the disputes procedure.
If he does subsequently take his case to court, "[t]he court performs
principally a reviewing function,' 12 focusing on "the validity of
the administrative action."' 29  Not until the disputes decision is
made, does the contractor's right to bring a civil action in the
courts mature.
I submit that the ultimate result of the Bianchi case, reinforced
by the Grace, Utah Construction, and Crown Coat cases, has been
to transform what was originally conceived as a suit de novo for
breach of contract into an appeal, admittedly one of limited scope,
but an appeal nevertheless. But even if this conclusion is accepted,
what is there in it to explain the S & E decision? Why cannot such
an appeal be mutual? If the contractor can appeal, why not the
Government?
This question brings us to the heart of the majority opinion.
For who is to take such an appeal on behalf of the Government?
Not the contracting agency, because it is the very agency which
made the decision, either directly, as in the S & E case, or more
commonly, through a board of contract appeals, expressly desig-
nated in the governing regulations as the "authorized representa-
tive" of the head of the agency, with power to act finally in his
name and stead.' 30 Under the current disputes procedure, the agency
head cannot reverse the decision of the board; 13 why should he be
allowed to "appeal" it?
As a practical matter, this leaves only two officials who could
force, or "take," an appeal, the Comptroller General and the Attor-
ney General. Without getting into the vexed questions of the pow-
ers of these agencies (to be discussed later), or the metaphysical
question of the One and the Many (the Government as "Hydra"),
the question really becomes one of standing to appeal: Does the
127. 386 U.S. at 511.
128. Id. at 513.
129. Id.
130. See 32 C.F.R. § 30.1 (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 5-60.101(a) (1972).
131. 32 C.F.R. § 30.1, para. 1 (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 5-60.101(a) (1972). Cer-
tain exceptions are made to cover cases where, under older versions of the dispute
clause, the agency head can reject or accept the recommendation of the board and
cases where the agency head directs the board to render him only an advisory opin-
ion. But such cases are now rare and, when they do arise, there is no final decision
until the agency head himself makes it, in which event the case against appeal by the
agency is even stronger.
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Government, or any part of it, have standing to appeal a disputes
decision in favor of a contractor? This was clearly perceived by
Judge Skelton, dissenting in the Court of Claims.132 In fact, Judge
Skelton went further and denied that there was any controversy be-
tween the Government and the contractor in the case, let alone an
"appeal," and argued that therefore there was no question before
the court to be decided.' 33 The AEC had never repudiated its de-
cision. The GAO was not a party to the contract or to the suit: it
was guilty of "unjustified and completely unauthorized interfer-
ence."' 34 And the Attorney General, by his own admission in prior
rulings, "has no authority to review or overturn decisions of other
executive agencies upon questions of fact, of mixed fact and law,
policy, discretion, expediency or other matters peculiarly within the
jurisdiction of such agencies."' 35  He is the Government's lawyer,
no more, no less. In short, to allow an agency to appeal from its
own decision would be "to sanction an absurd and ridiculous pro-
ceeding";136 the Comptroller General is a stranger to the proceed-
ing; and the Attorney General has no authority to take an appeal
which the executive agency itself is "without power to engage in."137
Neither Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court nor the concur-
ring opinion by Mr. Justice Blackmun add very much to this ad-
mirable summation of what is really at issue, although they do sweep
aside the possible exceptions that Judge Skelton was willing to con-
cede might exist to his approach.
Of course the situation would be very different if the disputes
decision were made by a tribunal completely independent of the
contracting agency, as the Tax Court is independent of the Treasury
Department. Judge Nichols, writing the majority opinion for the
Court of Claims, went to great length to assert the de facto inde-
pendence of the boards of contract appeals:
We think the Wunderlich Act and the Supreme Court decisions
interpreting it, in attributing finality to the extent they do to de-
cisions of these Boards, necessarily imply an expectation that the
Boards ...will enjoy a degree of independence approaching and
comparable to that of the various independent quasi-judicial and
regulatory boards and commissions which, too, can make binding
132. 433 F.2d at 1381.
133. Id. at 1381-82.
134. Id. at 1382.
135. Id. at 1388.
136. Id. at 1390.
137. Id.
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fact findings .... Having achieved this, it would be inconsistent
and unfair for the law to turn around and pretend that the Board
and the Secretary were the same.188
One can concede the impartiality and de facto independence
of the various boards of contract appeals. It remains true that they
are not legally independent of their respective agencies, which ap-
point them, pay them, furnish them staff and facilities, and so on.189
Until this changes, and the boards become independent tribunals in
their own right, it is difficult to see how the agency head can dis-
sociate himself from one of their decisions by "appealing" it. And
of course in the S & E case itself, as Judge Nichols admitted, there
was no board at all; the decision was made by the AEC itself.
To summarize:
1. Under the traditional view, embodied in the statutes and no-
where expressly repudiated, that an action under the Tucker Act is
a suit de novo, to which the finality of a disputes decision is only a
plea in bar, there is really no answer to Mr. Justice Brennan's argu-
ment that the question of finality is litigable, within the confines of
the Wunderlich Act, by either party, by whatever procedural device
the issue is brought before the court;
2. Under a more realistic view, that what is really involved is
an appeal from a disputes decision, there is no satisfactory answer to
Judge Skelton's argument, adopted in substance if not expressly by
a majority of the Supreme Court, that under existing procedures
there is no agency or official in the Government with standing to
prosecute an appeal from a disputes decision adverse to the Govern-
ment.
As stated above, I do not propose to try to resolve this di-
lemma. Rather, I prefer to discuss what, if any, legislative change
is now indicated. Before doing so, however, I would like to discuss
briefly a few of the other problems raised or touched on in the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.
"The Curious Role of the Comptroller General.'140
The action which the Comptroller General took in the S & E
Contractors case was based initially on a statute which reads:
138. Id. at 1379-80.
139. An exception must be made for those agencies which do little contracting
and refer the few contract disputes that they have to one of the major boards.
But this hardly changes the overall picture.
140. The phrase is used in Schultz, supra note 103, at 132.
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The liability of certifying officers or employees shall be en-
forced in the same manner and to the same extent as now provided
by law with respect to enforcement of the liability of disbursing and
other accountable officers; and they shall have the right to apply for
and obtain a decision by the Comptroller General on any question of
law involved in a payment on any vouchers presented to them for
certification.14'
But he went on to consider not merely the specific voucher
presented to him, which involved only a small part of the contrac-
tor's claim, but also the entire decision of the AEC. He based his
authority to do this on section 305 of the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921, which reads:
All claims and demands whatever by the Government of the
United States or against it, and all accounts whatever in which the
Government of the United States is concerned, either as debtor or
creditor, shall be settled and adjusted in the General Accounting of-
fice.142
The Comptroller has always given this language a broad inter-
pretation, arguing that it grants him the authority not only to "settle
and adjust," but to allow or disallow payment of claims, and to re-
cover (by way of offset) claims which may have been improperly
paid.143 He concedes, of course, the power of the courts to adjudi-
cate claims properly brought before them and of the Attorney Gen-
eral to compromise and settle claims in the course of litigation. But
otherwise, he has asserted final authority over claims handled by the
executive branch, including contract claims. If the claim was based
on a disputes decision, he would recognize the finality of that de-
cision, but only within the confines of the Wunderlich Act.
144
The Comptroller General was able to exercise this extraordi-
nary power because, whereas in all other matters the contracting of-
ficer reigns supreme over his contract (subject only to an appeal
under the disputes clause) and takes orders from no one, he has no
authority to make payments to the contractor. All he can do is for-
ward a contractor's vouchers to a certifying officer for certification,
who in turn forwards them to a disbursing officer for payment.
Each of the latter, no matter how low down on the totem pole, has
141. Disbursing and Certifying Officers Act of 1941, 31 U.S.C. § 82d (1970).
142. 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1970).
143. Jurisdiction of the General Accounting Office-Damages, Contracts, 4
CouT. GEN. 404, 405 (1924).
144. S & E Contractors, Inc., 46 CoM. GENs. 441, 459 (1966).
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a direct line to the Comptroller General and can ask him whether
a particular voucher may properly be certified for payment, and the
Comptroller will render a decision in the matter.' 45  The certifying
or disbursing officer does this for his own protection because, if he
approves or makes an improper payment, the Comptroller General
can surcharge his accounts and hold him personally liable.' 4"
Critics of the Comptroller General, who are legion, 147 argue that
the statutory language "settle and adjust" is much too vague and
general to confer the power to disallow claims already decided by
a contracting agency, that at most they grant the ordinary power
of an accountant and auditor who, while he may question the pro-
priety of certain claims, and report accordingly, must leave the de-
cision thereon to management. 148
This controversy has never been finally resolved by the Su-
preme Court as a matter of general principle. But in the S & E
case, the Court quite clearly ruled that, once a disputes decision has
been made within the contracting agency, the Comptroller General
has no further power to question it, even if it fails to meet the stand-
ards for finality of the Wunderlich Act.
It was argued to the Court that the Comptroller General had
not claimed any power to "review" the AEC decision, but only "to
force the contractor to bring suit and thus to obtain judicial review
for the Government.' 49  Technically, this may be correct, but it is
a matter of semantics. In fact, as Mr. Justice Douglas observed, the
Comptroller General "conducted a 33-month de novo review of the
AEC proceedings."' 50  In the course thereof, he obtained the com-
plete record of the appeal proceedings before the ABC (except for
145. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
146. 31 U.S.C. § 82c (1970).
147. "A policeman's lot is not a happy one," and the Comptroller General
has never had a good press in procurement circles. Contractors do not like it
when he disallows their claims (although of course they welcome his intervention
when he rules in their favor), and the contracting agencies do not like to be second-
guessed by an "outsider." For overall, more balanced views, see Birnbaum, Gov-
ernment Contracts: The Role of the Comptroller General, 42 A.B.A.J. 433 (1956);
Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 82; Welch, The General Accounting Office in Govern-
ment Procurement, 14 FED. BJ. 321 (1954). Specifically, on the Comptroller's
settlement powers, see Cibinic & Lasken, supra, at 351-52, 362-66; Note, The Comp-
troller General of the United States: The Broad Power to Settle and Adjust All
Claims and Accounts, 70 HARv. L. Rav. 350 (1956).
148. See, e.g., Note, supra note 147, at 364-65.
149. 406.U.S. at 12.
150. Id.
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certain exhibits) and "reviewed the entire record, not only with re-
spect to the particular items involved in the voucher submitted but
also with respect to all of the claims considered."'151 He obtained
comprehensive briefs from the attorneys for each side, held several
conferences with these attorneys, and, finally, wrote a decision of
102 printed pages. If this is not "judicial review," it is certainly
"review"; in fact, this is the term the Comptroller himself used.152
The answer of the dissent is that "GAO's view of the disputes
decision, however, was of no consequence in court,"'53 and that
"neither GAO nor the Department of Justice can take a favorable
decision away from the contractor. Only a court can do that."' 54
But the dissent could not, and did not, deny that the GAO review
had taken place and that it was a precipitating factor in bringing
about the law suit.
Again, it is not the purpose of this article to pass on the re-
spective merits of the two positions as to the powers of the Comp-
troller General (if indeed it can be said that the dissent took any
position at all on the matter). What is suggested is that, whether
or not the result in the S & E case is to be changed by legislation,
there should at least be a comprehensive overhaul of the Budget
and Accounting Act, now over 50 years old, and of the statutory
provisions on the duties of disbursing and certifying officers and
their relationship to the Comptroller General, now over 30 years old.
The Even More Curious Role of the Attorney General
In an opinion to the Secretary of the Air Force dated January
16, 1969,"55 which was given in a different case, the then Attorney
General, Ramsey Clark, took the position that the Comptroller
General had no authority to disapprove a disputes decision (this
one happened to be in favor of the Government) even on a question
of law, and to request that the claim be remanded to the ASBCA
for further proceedings in accordance with his opinion. 56 He con-
ceded, however, the authority of the Comptroller to block payment
under a disputes decision in favor of a contractor by disallowing
151. 46 Comp. GEN. 441, 451 (1966).
152. Id.
153. 406 U.S. at 25.
154. Id. at 66-67.
155. 42 Op. AWry GEN. No. 33, 13 CCH CoNr. CAS. FED. 82,490 (Jan. 16,
1969).
156. 13 CCH CoNrT. CAS. F D. 1 82,490, at 88,000.
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the item while performing his auditing function, or by giving an ad-
vance opinion to a disbursing or certifying officer against allowabil-
ity, thus forcing the contractor to sue, citing the Comptroller's dd-
cision in the S & E case.157  But, he added, this was not the only
avenue of relief open to the Government. The contracting agency
on its own initiative could obtain judicial review of such a decision,
through the Department of Justice, by calling to that Department's
attention, "on a continuing basis, appeals board decisions against the
Government which they feel warrant litigation in accordance with
the Wunderlich Act.' 158  The Department of Justice would then,
"as the attorneys for the Government," "make an independent ap-
praisal as to whether the suit can properly be litigated under the
Wunderlich Act."'159 He justified his proposed procedure as "part
of the Executive responsibility for administering and enforcing Gov-
ernment contracts."' 60  Admittedly, he said, "not all the procedural
possibilities for accomplishing this result have been the subject of
definitive judicial pronouncements. .. .
In a footnote he distinguished the "separate functions of ad-
judication and advocacy" within the contracting agency, the former
belonging to the board of contract appeals and the latter to "other
organs of the agency," whether representing the agency before the
board or deciding to seek review.' 6 (This seems to be an obvious
attempt to forestall the objection that the agency would be repudiat-
ing its own decision.)
It is not known whether any agencies took advantage of this
generous invitation. The proposed procedure was not directly be-
fore the Court in the S & E case, but the Court's opinion effectively
disposes of it in two steps:
1. The disputes decision is the decision of the agency, in fact
of the Government as a whole, and may not subsequently be re-
pudiated by any government agency (except of course a court),
even for the purpose of obtaining judicial review.
2. The Attorney General's duty is to "conduct" and "super-
vise"168 litigation to which the United States is a party. There is
157. 46 Comp. GEN. 441 (1966).
158. 13 CCH CONT. CAS. Fmn. 82,490, at 88,003-04.
159. Id. f 82,490, at 88,004.
160. Id. 82,490, at 88,003.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 406 U.S. at 12, citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (1970).
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nothing in the statutes which gives him the right to "appeal" '164 from
a disputes decision made by a contracting agency. "Normally,
where the responsibility for rendering a decision is vested in a coordi-
nate branch of Government, the duty of the Department of Justice is
to implement that decision and not to repudiate it."'165
Judge Skelton, dissenting in the Court of Claims,16 6 used even
stronger language. Citing numerous precedents, including prior
statements of the Attorneys General themselves, and an Executive
Order' 67 which gave the Department of Justice broad powers to
handle cases in court for governmental agencies, he said he could
find nothing which gave the Attorney General "any review or re-
visory power over decisions made by other agencies on matters pe-
culiarly within their jurisdictions."'168
I submit that these views (even though that of Ir. Justice
Douglas is qualified by the word "normally") are too narrow. The
Attorney General is more than a mere "mouthpiece' for the execu-
tive agencies. He is a member of the Cabinet and the chief legal ad-
viser to the President, with important reponsibilities in his own right:
to name only two, enforcement of criminal and antitrust laws.
Should he not have the power, somehow, to challenge in court a de-
cision of an executive agency which in his opinion raises a serious
question of law?
The Government's brief in the S & E case, prepared of course
by or under the supervision of the Solicitor General, argues against
a narrow reading of the authority of the Attorney General:
The statutes do not subject [his] authority . . . to the ultimate
control of the agency whose decision may be the cause of the litiga-
tion. Thus, unlike attorneys representing private clients, the Attor-
ney General cannot be replaced by his "client," for failure to follow
instructions, but has the full responsibility to determine and defend
the government's interest.'6 9
Nevertheless, within the framework of the disputes procedure,
there remain serious practical problems and questions of standing, of
the kind discussed above, which make it difficult for the Attorney
164. 406 U.S. at 12.
165. Id. at 13.
166. 433 F.2d at 1381.
167. Exec. Order No. 6166, 5 U.S.C. § 901 (1970).
168. 433 F.2d at 1390.
169. Brief for United States at 33, S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States,
406 U.S. 1 (1972).
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General to assert the authority he has claimed, and Ramsey Clark's
opinion of January 16, 1969, does not really offer any clearcut solu-
tion. Of course the point is now academic under the S & E
decision. But, whether or not S & E is to be overruled by Congress,
and apart from the context of the disputes procedure, the overall
question of the authority and responsiblity of the Attorney General
in conducting government litigation is too important to remain in
the unsatisfactory state where the opinion of the Supreme Court
leaves it. Again, legislative action seems called for. At the very
least, the Attorney General should be able to litigate important
questions of law on behalf of the Government, whatever the wishes
of the "client" agency.
It is interesting that, while Attorney General Ramsey Clark was
prepared to concede the power of the Comptroller General to take
the action he had in the S & E case, Solicitor General Griswold re-
fused to take a position on the point, advancing the argument,
which was accepted by Mr. Justice Brennan, that the question was
not involved in the case once the matter came before the Court. 110
Instead, he allowed the Comptroller General to set forth his own
views in a ten page appendix to the Government's brief.171
To petitioner's contention that the question of the Comptroller
General's authority was crucial to the case, the Solicitor General an-
swered that the action of the Comptroller was irrelevant; that what
really "triggered" the law suit was the AEC's refusal to pay, and
that this might have been occasioned by doubts as to the soundness
of its own prior decision, after the GAO intervention, and a resolve
to seek judicial review.1 72  This appeal to the discredited doctrine
of the "intervening cause"'' 7  is not very convincing. To use an-
other formula from the murky cauldron of causation, we could say
that, "but for"'174 the action of the Comptroller General, it is quite
clear that the S & E case would never have come to court.
The Role of the Contracting Officer-"Curiouser and Curiouser!"
The Wunderlich Act says nothing, as such, about the Contract-
ing Officer, the person whose initial decision starts the whole dis-
putes procedure into motion. Section 1 speaks only of a "decision
170. Id. at 24-27.
171. Id. at 41-50.
172. Id. at 27-29.
173. See W. ftosSma, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 44 (4th ed. 1971).
174. See id. § 41.
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of the head of any department or agency or his duly authorized
representative or board."'175 (Section 2, dealing with questions of
law, speaks of the decision of "any administrative official."' 76  This
would of course include a Contracting Officer, but of this, more
anon.)
If we turn to the standard disputes clause, however, we find a
good deal about the Contracting Officer. He is to decide "any dis-
pute concerning a question of fact arising under this contract which
is not disposed of by agreement," and "reduce his decision to writ-
ing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the Contrac-
tor." 1 77 There is no requirement that he conduct a hearing, write
an opinion, or indeed give any reasons at all for his decision, al-
though of course he is not precluded from doing any of these
things. The clause goes on to say that the "decision of the Con-
tracting Officer shall be final and conclusive unless, within 30 days
from the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor mails or other-
wise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed
to the Secretary."'1 78 No exception to this finality provision is made
for fraud, capriciousness, arbitrariness, or lack of substantial evi-
dence.
Clearly this provision binds the contractor under the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 179 It has always been as-
sumed that it binds the Government as well. 80 This would result
in the anomaly, if the Government's position in S & E were sound,
that, whereas a mere Contracting Officer's decision, made without
any requirement of a hearing or formal justification, is binding in all
events on the Government, the decision of the head of the agency,
or his duly designated representative, is not. Judge Collins made
much of this anomaly, dissenting in the Court of Claims: "While an
agency will still be bound by the decisions of its contracting officers,
it will not be bound by decisions made at the highest level."'' In
his concurring opinion in the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Black-
mun repeats this argument and quotes Judge Collins' observa-
tions.' 82
175. 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
176. Id. § 322.
177. 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12 (1972); 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.101-12 (1972).
178. Id.
179. See United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234 (1946).
180. See Shedd, supra note 8, at 64.
181. 433 F.2d at 1398.
182. 406 U.S. at 21.
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To the extent that the anomaly exists, it is inherent in the lan-
guage of the disputes clause itself and in the silence of the Wunder-
lich Act on the matter and is really not very persuasive in constru-
ing quite different language relating to the agency decision which
is found both in the clause and in the Act.18 But if the anomaly
persists, it is simply one more strange and curious aspect of the
"Alice-in-Wunderlich ' l4 world of the disputes procedure.
The Comptroller General's answer to the argument was that:
There is a fundamental distinction between the decision of a
contracting officer and that of a Board of Contract Appeals ...
• . . Boards function as independent tribunals, much like courts.
Contracting officers, on the other hand, are expected to represent the
government's interests. This distinction between a Board and a con-
tracting officer is important. Boards of Contract Appeals should
function as independent adjudicators of contract disputes, with both
parties having equal rights to challenge their decisions.' 8s
This argument is repeated in a footnote to the main portion of the
Government's brief, 80 but obviously it did not persuade Mr. Justice
Blackmun, whatever else may be said for it.
Questions of Law
Even before the Wunderlich Act, the Court of Claims had con-
sistently held that a disputes decision would not be accorded finality
on "questions of law.' 8 7  Most disputes clauses limited finality to
questions of fact, but sometimes an "all-disputes" clause, not so
limited, was used. The validity of such a clause was upheld by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Moorman,188 and boards of con-
183. This is pointed out by Mr. Justice Brennan. Id. at 26 n.1.
184. Cf. 18 CAmT. U.L. Rev. 544 (1969).
185. Brief for United States, supra note 169, at 49.
186. Id. at 29 n.15.
187. Moorman v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 1010 (Ct. Cl. 1949), rev'd, 338
U.S. 457 (1950); Pfotzer v. United States, 77 F. Sapp. 390 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 885 (1948); Callahan Constr. Co. v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 538, 616
(1940). The law-fact dichotomy is as difficult to apply in this area as in any
other, and no attempt is made here to explore its ramifications. See Birnbaum,
Questions of Law and Fact and the Jurisdiction of the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals, 19 FED. BJ. 120 (1959); Spector, "Law" Is Where You Find It,
Or "Fact" Is in the Eye of the Beholder, 19 FED. BJ. 212 (1959); Note, Judicial
Review of Government Contracts Disputes-The Lav-Fact Dichotomy, 9 Wm. &
MAUY L. R v. 857 (1968).
188. 338 U.S. 457 (1950). The strength of this case as a precedent is weak-
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tract appeals regularly passed on questions of law (not necessarily
with finality) in deciding questions of fact.
Section 2 of the Wunderlich Act expressly prohibits use of a
disputes clause which purports to make "final on a question of law
the decision of any administrative official, representative, or
board."'18 9 Echoing this provision, the standard disputes clause,
while it permits consideration of law questions, specifically provides
that nothing in the contract "shall be construed as making final the
decision of any administrative official, representative, or board on a
question of law."'190
One of the grounds on which the Comptroller General placed
his ruling in the S & E case was that it contained "serious errors of
law." 91 When suit was brought in court, one of the defenses raised
by the Department of Justice was that the decision was "erroneous
as a matter of law."'192
Although the point thus seems to have been squarely presented,
neither the opinion of the Court nor the concurring opinion says a
single word about it beyond reciting the bare fact of the pleadings.
While this seems astonishing, it may be due in part to the fact that
the Government's brief itself relegated the matter to a footnote at
the very end.' 93 Be that as it may, Mr. Justice Brennan aptly ob-
served in his dissent:
Finally, the Act flatly prohibits disputes clauses that make dis-
putes decisions final on questions of law. The clause before us, fol-
lowing the Act, expressly provided that the Commission's disputes
decisions could not be final on questions of law. Yet, in the face of
the Act and the disputes clause, the Court holds that the Commis-
sion's decision is final on questions of law.' 94
It is hard to answer this. The implication of the Court's deci-
sion on this point, so far as the Government is concerned, is either
that-
1. section 2 of the Wunderlich Act does not mean what it
says; or
ened, however, by uncertainty whether the dispute really involved a question of law
or a question of fact-an uncertainty which the Court did not resolve.
189. See note 176 supra and accompanying text.
190. See note 177 supra and accompanying text.
191. 46 CoMe. GEN. at 463.
192. 406 U.S. at 3.
193. Brief for United States, supra note 169, at 40 n.21.
194. 406 U.S. at 30-31.
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2. it means what it says, but is illusory.
The former is untenable, the latter unsatisfactory.
The Problem of Fraud
As the Court noted, the issue of fraud was not before it. But
the Douglas opinion discusses the matter at some length:
A contractor's fraud is of course a wholly different genus ...
Even where the contractor has obtained a judgment and the time for
review of it has expired, fraud on an administrative agency or on the
court enforcing the agency action is ground for setting aside the judg-
ment.19 5
He proceeded to list a series of judge-made rules and statutes, other
than the Wunderlich Act, which he concluded afforded the Govern-
ment adequate protection.' 9 6
All this is true but, as Mr. Justice Brennan points out,'19 7 it is
beside the point. The fraud which the Wunderlich Act speaks of is
not the contractor's fraud, but fraud committed by the contracting
agency, specifically by the board or other representative making the
disputes decision. As against this kind of fraud, the S & E decision
gives the Government no more recourse than in the case of ques-
tions of law, despite the plain language of the statute that a disputes
decision is not final where it is fraudulent. In particular, Mr. Justice
Brennan notes:
Today's decision produces the absurd result that when the Gov-
ernment agreed to a disputes clause with no provision for judicial re-
view [referring to the pre-Wunderlich clause], it could nevertheless
challenge the finality of a disputes decision at least for fraud, but
now that the Government has agreed to a disputes clause specifying
five grounds of judicial review, including fraud, it is entitled, holds
the Court, to none at all. The Government's position is thus worse
than it was before the Act, for it is deprived of even the limited re-
view for fraud to which it was entitled under Wunderlich. 98
As a practical matter, though, fraud by a board of contract
appeals is extremely rare, virtually non-existent. If it ever does oc-
cur, in a decision against the Government, it would nearly always be
accompanied by collusion with the contractor, who would be equally
195. Id. at 15.
196. Id. at 15-17.
197. Id. at 30 n.4.
198. Id. at 30.
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tainted with the fraud. In such a case, Mr. Justice Douglas's rem-
edies would be applicable, and perhaps that was what he had in mind.
But it does seem a backhanded way of approaching a problem on
which the Wunderlich Act speaks very plainly.
Moreover, while it might be possible to conjure up a case in
which a board of contract appeals was guilty of fraud (or its near
relative, bad faith) without the collusion of the contractor, it is
probable that in any such case the Government could set aside any
award to the contractor on a theory of mistake or unjust enrich-
ment.199 So, while Mr. Justice Brennan's criticism seems well-taken,
its practical import is not great, if indeed it has any practical signifi-
cance at all.
Is AmENDATORY LEGISLATION NECESSARY?
In the preceding sections dealing with the roles of the Comp-
troller General and of the Attorney General, it was suggested that
clarifying legislation would seem to be in order to define their au-
thority and responsibility more precisely after the uncertainties cre-
ated by the S & E decision (uncertainties which admittedly existed
even before that decision). But is broader legislation desirable;
specifically, a statute overruling the S & E case itself?
Before addressing ourselves to this question, we should dispose
of one bugbear, namely the horrendous consequences of the S & E
decision predicted by Mr. Justice Brennan. The Court's decision, he
says, "might mean the loss of more than one million dollars to
American taxpayers. But at stake are countless millions. ' 200  And
again, "[T]he devastation today's decision wreaks upon Government
procurement practices is sufficient justification [for the length of
his opinion], and Congress should be alert to the urgent need for
immediate remedial legislation." 0' 1
Both statements are exaggerations. It is true that over a million
dollars was involved in the S & E case. This is a large sum indeed,
but it is still a minuscule percentage of an annual federal budget of
over $250 billion. Moreover, there is no assurance that a contrary
decision by the Court would have netted a million dollars for the
199. Cf. United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 415 (1938); Wisconsin Cent.
R.R. v. United States, 164 U.S. 190 (1896); J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States,
308 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1962).
200. 406 U.S. at 60.
201. Id. at 31.
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taxpayers. The case had yet to be tried on the merits. A trial
might have gone either way or have resulted in an intermediate sum
being found due. Weighing against this uncertainty was the un-
conscionable delay and great hardship caused to the contractor. As
for the countless other millions at stake and the "devastation"
wrought upon government procurement practices, these charges are
simply not true. By the Solicitor General's own admission, 0 2 the
number of cases in which the Government has sought judicial re-
view of a disputes decision has been very few, with no evidence of
an impending increase.
In short, the practical result of the S & E decision will not be
very great. If legislative change is to be justified, it must be on
broader grounds. I submit that the problem can only be con-
sidered sensibly as part of the more general question whether legis-
lative overhaul of the entire disputes procedure is in order. As to
this, there are as many views as there are commentators. But
broadly speaking, the different suggestions can be grouped under
four general headings.
Retention in Substance of the Present Procedure
On the whole, the disputes procedure has worked well. A
study made in 1958 showed that only one contract transaction out of
10,000 resulted in an appeal to a board of contract appeals.20 3
The average time for disposing of such an appeal in the ASBCA
has in recent years been about 11 months, 204 and over 95 per cent of
these are disposed of without further court action.205
And so it is not surprising that the most comprehensive study
3f the disputes procedure which has been undertaken, that con-
ducted by Professor Harold C. Petrowitz for the Select Committee
on Small Business of the United States Senate, 00 should have con-
cluded that no major legislative reform was necessary, although it
did recommend a number of procedural reforms, which could be
accomplished administratively.
It is submitted that, if this is to be the approach, it would be
202. Brief for United States, supra note 169, at 37-39.
203. DISTRICT OF COLUMBI BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON PUBLIC CON-
TBACrs, cited in Shedd, supra note 8, at 41.
204. Shedd, supra note 8, at 41.
205. Id.
206. See S. Doc. No. 99, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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unwise, as well as unnecessary, to attempt legislative repeal of the
S & E result. The problem is simply not that important, and the
difficulties of engrafting an "appeal" by the Government on the
existing procedures are too great to warrant it. It is more than
likely that such legislation would create as many problems as it
would solve.
The "All Disputes" Approach
Probably the greatest difficulty with the present system is the
"fragmentation of remedies" problem.2 °7 Disputes as to "facts" go
the board of contract appeals route; claims for "breach" go to the
courts. But it is often very difficult for the contractor to know
which he has; often he has both, intertwined in the same group of
claims. His only safe course is to pursue both remedies. If the
appeals board lacks jurisdiction, or thinks it does, it will dismiss
the appeal. Meanwhile, the Court of Claims will stay its proceed-
ings until conclusion of the proceedings before the appeals board.
But this is cumbersome. Although the statute of limitations prob-
lem has been resolved by the Crown Coat208 case, much confusion,
uncertainty, and delay remain.
A solution, given tacit approval by the Supreme Court in the
Utah Construction20 9 case, is to move to an "all-disputes" procedure
-that is, revise the disputes clause and other contract clauses to
provide that all disputes and claims, of whatever nature, be taken
first to a board of contract appeals. If the contractor were satisfied
with the result, the matter would stop there. If he wished to pursue
a further "appeal" to the courts, he might do so within the limits of
the Wunderlich Act.
This change could be accomplished administratively without
legislative action. It has the merit of apparent simplicity, and some
commentators have urged it vigorously.21 0 Others, including the
207. Cf. Shedd, Fragmentation of Remedies-The "All Disputes" Solution, 28
FED. B.I 185 (1968).
208. See notes 122-29 supra and accompanying text.
209. See notes 119-21 supra and accompanying text.
210. Lane, Administrative Resolution of Government Breaches-The Case for an
All-Breach Clause, 28 Fo. BJ. 199 (1968); Moss, Judicial Review of Federal
Contract Appeals Decisions Today-The Necessity For an All Disputes Procedure,
3 Put. CoNT. L.J 80 (1970); Sachter, Resolution of Disputes Under United States
Government Contracts: Problems and Proposals, 2 PuB. CoNT. L. 363 (1969);
Shedd, supra note 207.
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former Chairman of the ASBCA, see many difficulties. 211 One
which occurs to me is that the position of the Government would be
greatly impaired in the case of breach of contract claims. At pres-
ent, when a breach of contract case is heard in the courts, the Gov-
ernment gets a full hearing, with the same rights of review or appeal
as the contractor. If the same case were to be decided by a board
of contract appeals, while the Government would have a full hearing
before the board, it would not be able to obtain judicial review in
consequence of the S & E decision. The anomaly which now exists
with respect to questions of law which arise in connection with fac-
tual disputes would be greatly compounded. If this proposal were
adopted, therefore, it would appear to be necessary to give the Gov-
ernment the right to obtain judicial review, at the very least, of all
breach of contract cases, if not of all questions of law. This would
require legislation, and it is more than likely that the Department of
Justice would urge that such legislation go further and cover all the
exceptions of the Wunderlich Act. The advantages, if any, of the
new procedure to the contractor would be offset, and he would lose
some or all of the benefits of the S & E decision. The overall gain
to the administrative process would be dubious.
The Election-of-Remedies Proposal
Another suggestion is to give the contractor an election, after
an adverse decision by the contracting officer, to follow the board
of contracts appeals route or to go directly to court for a complete
trial of his whole case on the merits.21 Insofar as the contractor
might elect the judicial remedy, the proposal is just the reverse of the
"all-disputes" clause approach: the court would have full jurisdic-
tion over all claims, whether based on factual or legal disputes.
Adoption of this proposal would not seem to have any imme-
diate impact on our problem. In those cases in which the contractor
appealed to a board, the situation would be as it now is. Where he
followed the judicial route, the same avenues of review or appeal
would be available to both sides as now exist with respect to Tucker
Act claims in the courts. In neither case would remedial legislation
appear to be necessary.
The "all-disputes" clause is beginning to make its appearance. See, e.g., Patton
Wrecking & Demolition Co. v. TVA, 465 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1972).
211. Spector, supra note 117. See also Speck, Concerning an "All-Breach"
Contract Disputes Clause, 29 FED. BJ. 47 (1968).
212. Spector, supra note 117, at 11.
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The Institutional Approach
The fourth approach is to "judicialize" the whole disputes pro-
cedure. 213 In lieu of the present boards of contract appeals in the
separate agencies, there would be established a government-wide
Court of Contract Appeals, on the analogy of the United States Tax
Court, which "would handle all government contract disputes cases,
whether arising from contractors' claims against the government or
from contractor appeals from government deficiency assessments." '214
Appeal would lie from this court to the United States Court of Appeals,
as in the case of the Tax Court, and such an appeal could be taken
by either side. A variant on this would be to interpose an impar-
tial hearing officer between the contracting officer and the Court of
Contract Appeals.21 5 Under one version of this proposal, the new
court would take all claims by government contractors, including
breach of contract claims.2 18  This would virtually eliminate Court of
Claims jurisdiction over contract cases, unless indeed the Court of
Claims itself became the Court of Contract Appeals.211
The proposal has a certain attractiveness from the standpoint
of symmetry and order. It would assure greater independence to
the appeals tribunal, would cure the "fragmentation of remedies"
problem, would eliminate the S & E controversy, and would proba-
bly have other benefits as well. On the other hand, there are serious
objections: the substitution of a new and untried court for both the
present boards of appeal and the Court of Claims, with their ac-
cumulated expertise, the tremendous workload which would be
thrust on the new court, and the undoubted delay and increased for-
mality which are almost bound to accompany judicialization of an
administrative process, to say nothing of the unforeseen problems
which always arise when new legislation is enacted. 18
CONCLUSION
To those who have followed the evolution of the contract dis-
putes procedure since the Wunderlich case, the result of the S & E
213. Lidstone & Witte, Administration of Government Contracts: Disputes and
Claims Procedures, 46 VA. L. RPv. 252 (1960); Note, supra note 115.
214. Note, supra note 115, at 1451-52.
215. Id. at 1454-57.
216. Id. at 1458; Lidstone & Witte, supra note 213, at 294-95.
217. Note, supra note 115, at 1457.
218. Some of the objections are outlined by Frenzen, Some Thoughts on the
Similarity of the Boards of Contract Appeals and Commercial Arbitration, 3 PUB.
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Contractors case comes as no great surprise. It can be defended as
consistent with the aims and purposes of the disputes procedure
and with the way that procedure has actually developed in practice
since the Wunderlich Act. It can be criticized as failing to give the
Government its "day in court," especially on questions of law, and
as inconsistent with precedent, with the theory of suits under the
Tucker Act, and with the language of the Wunderlich Act.
Given the decision as a fait accompli, however, and given the
present procedure without substantial change, amendatory legislation
would seem to be unwise and unnecessary. But if there should be
wide adoption of an "all-disputes" clause, the question will have to
be reconsidered. And if a sweeping "judicialization" reform is
adopted, the problem will solve itself.*
CONT. LJ. 56, 77-79 (1970); Spector, supra note 117; Spector, Government Con-
tract Disputes and Judicial Remedies-An Overview, 2 NAT'L CONT. MANAGEMMT
J. 7 (1968).
* AuToR's NOTE: Since completion of this article, my attention has been
called to the Report of the Commission on Government Procurement, created in
November 1969, to study and recommend to Congress methods "to promote the
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness" of procurement by the executive branch of
the Government. Act of Nov. 26, 1969, Pub. L. 91-129, 83 Stat. 269. The Com-
mission's Report was published in December 1972. It concludes that "the present
system for resolving contract disputes in connection with contract performance needs
significant change if it is to provide effective justice." 4 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, pt. G (1972). Although it would retain the basic
structure of the present disputes procedure, the Commission has recommended, inter
alia, adoption of an "all-disputes" clause, the election of remedies approach, and,
most important in the present context, overruling of the S & E decision so as to
"grant both the Government and contractors judicial review of adverse agency boards
of contract appeals decisions" (Recommendation 7). Five of the twelve Commis-
sioners dissented from the latter recommendation on the grounds that to grant the
Government the right to judicial review "(1) would undermine the integrity of the
disputes process, (2) would expose contractors to protracted reviews of disputes, and
(3) is unneeded."
Unfortunately, time and space do not permit a more detailed discussion of the
position of the Commission on this matter.
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